Model-Checking Markov Chains in the presence of Uncertainties by Sen, Koushik et al.
Model-Checking Markov Chains in the presence of
Uncertainties
Koushik Sen, Mahesh Viswanathan, Gul Agha
Department of Computer Science,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
{ksen,vmahesh,agha}@uiuc.edu
Abstract. We investigate the problem of model checking Interval-valued
Discrete-time Markov Chains (IDTMC). IDTMCs are discrete-time finite
Markov Chains for which the exact transition probabilities are not known. In-
stead in IDTMCs, each transition is associated with an interval in which the ac-
tual transition probability must lie. We consider two semantic interpretations for
the uncertainty in the transition probabilities of an IDTMC. In the first interpre-
tation, we think of an IDTMC as representing a (possibly uncountable) family of
(classical) discrete-time Markov Chains, where each member of the family is a
Markov Chain whose transition probabilities lie within the interval range given
in the IDTMC. This semantic interpretation we call Uncertain Markov Chains
(UMC). In the second semantics for an IDTMC, which we call Interval Markov
Decision Process (IMDP), we view the uncertainty as being resolved through
non-determinism. In other words, each time a state is visited, we adversarially
pick a transition distribution that respects the interval constraints, and take a
probabilistic step according to the chosen distribution. We show that the PCTL
model checking problem for both Uncertain Markov Chain semantics and Inter-
val Markov Decision Process semantics is decidable in PSPACE. We also prove
lower bounds for these model checking problems.
1 Introduction
Discrete time stochastic models such as Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) have
been used to analyze the correctness, reliability, and performance of systems [8, 11, 21,
15]. In a DTMC, the system is assumed to have finitely many states, and the system’s
future behavior is completely determined by its current state. From each state of the
system, the probability of transitioning to any other given state at the next step is fixed
and is given by the transition probability matrix of the DTMC.
The assumption that the system makes transitions according to a fixed distribution
at each step and that this distribution is precisely known when modeling, is a strong
assumption that may often not hold in practice [14, 17, 28, 16]. If the system being
modeled is an open system, i.e., interacts with an environment, then uncertainty in the
transitions may arise due to imperfect information about the environment. For example,
consider a system that interacts with an imperfect communication medium that may lose
messages. The probability of message loss may either depend on choice of the commu-
nication medium or on a complicated, time-varying dependence on events that are not
precisely understood at the time of modeling the system. Another source of impreci-
sion is that the transition probabilities in the system model are often estimated through
statistical experiments, which only provide bounds on the transition probabilities.
In order to faithfully capture these system uncertainties in stochastic models,
the model of Interval-valued Discrete-time Markov Chains (IDTMC) has been intro-
duced [14, 16]. These are DTMC models where the exact probability of taking a state
transition is not known, and instead the transition probability is assumed to lie within
a range associated with the transition. Two semantic interpretations have been sug-
gested for such models. Uncertain Markov Chains (UMC) [14] is an interpretation of
an IDTMC as a family of (possibly uncountably many) DTMCs, where each member of
the family is a DTMC whose transition probabilities lie within the interval range given
in the IDTMC. In the second interpretation, called Interval Markov Decision Process
(IMDP), we view the uncertainty as being resolved through non-determinism. In other
words, each time a state is visited, we adversarially pick a transition distribution that
respects the interval constraints, and take a probabilistic step according to the chosen
distribution. Thus, IMDPs allow the possibility of modeling a non-deterministic choice
made from a set of (possibly) uncountably many choices. An IMDP can be seen as a
generalization of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) [19, 3, 24].
We investigate the problem of model checking PCTL specifications for IDTMC.
The two semantic interpretations of IDTMCs yield very different model checking re-
sults (whenever the property has at least two probabilistic operators, not necessarily
nested; see example in Figure 1) and require different algorithmic techniques. For the
case of UMCs, we show that PCTL model checking problem can be reduced to finding
feasible solutions to inequality constraints, much like in the case of DTMC and MDP [8,
4, 3, 21, 7]. However, there is one important difference. The constraints to be solved in
the case of UMCs are polynomial and not just linear (as for DTMCs and MDPs). Since
the existential theory of reals is decidable in PSPACE [20, 6], the feasibility of the poly-
nomial constraints arising in model checking, can be determined by making a “query”
to the existential theory of reals. Thus, the PCTL model checking problem for UMCs
is in PSPACE. In practice, however, this algorithm may not be the most efficient. The
constraints we obtain during model checking all take a special form: the polynomials
are bilinear 1. Therefore, it might be more efficient to instead use algorithms for solv-
ing bilinear matrix inequalities (BMIs) [10, 9] or tools developed for this purpose [18].
Checking feasibility of BMIs is known to be NP-hard [26], but the exact complexity,
which is lower than PSPACE, is unknown. On the other hand, in the case of IMDPs,
we show that the model checking problem can be reduced to model checking an MDP
of exponential size. We then use known results for MDPs to show that IMDPs can be
model checked in PSPACE. We also present an iterative model checking algorithm for
IMDPs which may prove to be more efficient in practice.
In addition to demonstrating the decidability of the model checking problem, we
also prove lower bounds on the complexity of the model checking problem. We show
that the model checking problem for UMCs is NP-hard and co-NP-hard; thus, for UMCs
the problem is unlikely to be in P. A straightforward corollary of our results is that
solving BMIs is also co-NP-hard. For IMDPs, we can only show P-hardness; in fact,
even this is a consequence of the P-hardness of (classical) DTMC model checking.
1 The highest power of any variable in the polynomial is 1, and any term is the product of at
most two variables.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss related work next.
In Section 2 we formally define IDTMC and give its semantics as UMC and IMDP.
PCTL and the model checking problem is introduced in Section 3. We then revisit the
model checking algorithm for DTMC (Section 4) and present a modified version of
the classical algorithm. The ideas in the section play a key role in our UMC model
checking algorithm. Section 5 (UMC) and Section 6 (IMDP) contain our main results
about the model checking problem, providing both upper and lower bounds. Finally we
present our conclusions in Section 7. Motivating examples of UMCs and IMDPs and
observations about BMI optimization problems are deferred to Appendix.
Related Work. The model of IDTMCs has been introduced independently by Jons-
son and Larsen [14] and Kozine and Utkin [16] under the names interval specification
systems and interval-valued finite Markov chains, respectively. However, they consider
different semantic interpretations. Jonsson and Larsen consider the UMC interpreta-
tion and study bisimulation and simulation preorders for such an interpretation. Kozine
and Utkin, on the other hand, take the IMDP interpretation and present algorithms to
compute the probability distribution on the states after t steps. Neither of these papers
investigate the PCTL model checking problem which is the focus of this paper. We
introduce new names to emphasize the subtle semantic difference in the two interpreta-
tions. A more general model called generalized Markov processes for describing infinite
families of Markov Chains was introduced in [1]. In that paper, they showed that model
checking such models with respect to PCTL∗ (a more general logic than PCTL) is de-
cidable and has elementary complexity. PCTL model checking for classical DTMC and
MDP models has been considered in [8, 4, 3, 21, 7].
2 Formal Models
Definition 1. A discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) is a 4-tuple M = (S, sI ,P, L),
where
1. S is a finite set of states,
2. sI ∈ S is the initial state,
3. P : S×S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix, such that
∑
s′∈S P(s, s
′) = 1,
and
4. L : S → 2AP is a labeling function that maps states to sets of atomic propositions
from a set AP.
A non-empty sequence pi = s0s1s2 · · · is called a path of M, if each si ∈ S and
P(si, si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. We denote the ith state in a path pi by pi[i] = si. We let
Path(s) be the set of paths starting at state s. A probability measure on paths is induced
by the matrix P as follows.
Let s0, s1, . . . , sk ∈ S with P(si, si+1) > 0 for all 0 ≤ i < k. Then C(s0s1 . . . sk)
denotes a cylinder set consisting of all paths pi ∈ Path(s0) such that pi[i] = si (for
0 ≤ i ≤ k). Let B be the smallest σ-algebra on Path(s0) which contains all the cylinders
C(s0s1 . . . sk). The measure µ on cylinder sets can be defined as follows
µ(C(s0s1 . . . sk)) =

1 if k = 0
P(s0, s1) · · ·P(sk−1, sk) otherwise
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The probability measure on B is then defined as the unique measure that agrees with
µ (as defined above) on the cylinder sets.
Definition 2. An Interval-valued Discrete-time Markov chain (IDTMC) is a 5-tuple
I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L), where
1. S is a finite set of states,
2. sI ∈ S is the initial state,
3. Pˇ : S × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix, where each Pˇ(s, s′) gives the
lower bound of the transition probability from the state s to the state s′,
4. Pˆ : S × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix, where each Pˆ(s, s′) gives the
upper bound of the transition probability from the state s to the state s′,
5. L : S → 2AP is a labeling function that maps states to sets of atomic propositions
from a set AP.
We consider two semantics interpretations of an IDTMC model, namely Uncertain
Markov Chains (UMC) and Interval Markov Decision Processes (IMDP).
Uncertain Markov Chains An IDTMC I may represent an infinite set of DTMCs,
denoted by [I], where for each DTMC (S, sI ,P, L) ∈ [I] the following is true,
– Pˇ(s, s′) ≤ P(s, s′) ≤ Pˆ(s, s′) for all pairs of states s and s′ in S
In the Uncertain Markov Chains semantics, or simply, in the UMCs, we assume that the
external environment non-deterministically picks a DTMC from the set [I] at the be-
ginning and then all the transitions take place according to the chosen DTMC. Note that
in this semantics, the external environment makes only one non-deterministic choice.
Henceforth, we will use the term UMC to denote an IDTMC interpreted according to
the Uncertain Markov Chains semantics.
Interval Markov Decision Processes In the Interval Markov Decision Processes se-
mantics, or simply, in the IMDPs, we assume that before every transition the external
environment non-deterministically picks a DTMC from the set [I] and then takes a one-
step transition according to the probability distribution of the chosen DTMC. Note that
in this semantics, the external environment makes a non-deterministic choice before ev-
ery transition. Henceforth, we will use the term IMDP to denote an IDTMC interpreted
according to the Interval Markov Decision Processes semantics. We now formally de-
fine this semantics.
Let Steps(s) be the set of probability density functions over S defined as follows:
Steps(s) = {µ : S → R≥0 |
X
s′∈S
µ(s′) = 1 and Pˇ(s, s′) ≤ µ(s′) ≤ Pˆ(s, s′) for all s′ ∈ S}
In an IMDP, at every state s ∈ S, a probability density function µ is chosen non-
deterministically from the set Steps(s). A successor state s′ is then chosen according to
the probability distribution µ over S.
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A path pi in an IMDP I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L) is a non-empty sequence of the form
s0
µ1
→ s1
µ2
→ . . ., where si ∈ S, µi+1 ∈ Steps(si), and µi+1(si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 0.
A path can be either finite or infinite. We use pifin to denote a finite path. Let last(pifin)
be the last state in the finite path pifin. As in DTMC, we denote the ith state in a path
pi by pi[i] = si. We let Path(s) and Pathfin(s) be the set of all infinite and finite paths,
respectively, starting at state s. To associate a probability measure with the paths, we
resolve the non-deterministic choices by an adversary, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3. An adversaryA of an IMDP I is a function mapping every finite path pifin
of I onto an element of the set Steps(last(pifin)). LetAI denote the set of all possible ad-
versaries of the IMDP I. Let PathA(s) denote the subset of Path(s) which corresponds
to A.
The behavior of an IMDP I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L) under a given adversary A is purely
deterministic. The behavior of a IMDP I from a state s can be described by an infinite-
state DTMC MA = (SA, sAI ,PA, LA) where
– SA = Pathfin(s),
– sAI = s, and
– P
A(pifin, pi
′
fin) =
(
A(pifin)(s
′) if pi′fin is of the form pifin
A(pifin)→ s′
0 otherwise
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the paths ofMA and PathA(s) of I.
Therefore, we can define a probability measure ProbAs over the set of paths PathA(s)
using the probability measure of the DTMC MA.
3 Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL)
In this paper we consider a sub-logic of PCTL that excludes the steady-state probabilis-
tic operators. The formal syntax and semantics of this logic is as follows.
PCTL Syntax
φ ::= true | a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | P./p(ψ)
ψ ::= φ U φ | Xφ
where a ∈ AP is an atomic propositions, ./ ∈ {<,≤, >,≥}, p ∈ [0, 1], and k ∈ N.
Here φ represents a state formula and ψ represents a path formula.
PCTL Semantics for DTMC
The notion that a state s (or a path pi) satisfies a formula φ in a DTMC M is denoted
by s |=M φ (or pi |=M φ), and is defined inductively as follows:
s |=M true
s |=M a iff a ∈ L(s)
s |=M ¬φ iff s 6|=M φ
s |=M φ1 ∧ φ2 iff s |=M φ1 and s |=M φ2
s |=M P./p(ψ) iff Prob{pi ∈ Path(s) | pi |=M ψ} ./ p
pi |=M Xφ iff pi[1] |=M φ
pi |=M φ1 U φ2 iff ∃i ≥ 0 (pi[i] |=M φ2 and ∀j < i. pi[j] |=M φ1)
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Fig. 1. Example IDTMC and PCTL for-
mula φ. The UMC interpretation of the
IDTMC satisfies φ, whereas the IMDP in-
terpretation of the IDTMC violates φ
s |= true
s |= a iff a ∈ AP(s)
s |= ¬φ iff s 6|= φ
s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff s |= φ1 and s |= φ2
s |= P./p(ψ) iff ProbAs ({pi ∈ PathA(s) | pi |= ψ}) ./ p
for all A ∈ A
pi |= Xφ iff pi[1] |= φ
pi |= φ1 U φ2 iff ∃i ≥ 0 (pi[i] |= φ2 and ∀j < i. pi[j] |= φ1)
Fig. 2. PCTL semantics for IMDP
It can shown that for any path formula ψ and any state s, the set {pi ∈ Path(s) |
pi |=M ψ} is measurable [27]. A formula P./p(ψ) is satisfied by a state s if Prob[path
starting at s satisfies ψ] ./ p. The path formula Xφ holds over a path if φ holds at the
second state on the path. The formula φ1 U φ2 is true over a path pi if φ2 holds in some
state along pi, and φ holds along all prior states along pi.
Given a DTMC M and a PCTL state formula φ, M |= φ iff sI |=M φ.
PCTL Semantics for UMC
Given a UMC I and a PCTL state formula φ, we say I |= φ iff, for all M ∈ [I],
M |= φ. Note that I 6|= φ does not imply that I |= ¬φ. This because if I 6|= φ, there
may exist M,M′ ∈ [I] such that M |= φ and M′ |= ¬φ.
PCTL Semantics for IMDP
The interpretation of a state formula and a path formula of PCTL for IMDPs is same as
for DTMCs except for the state formulas of the form P./p(ψ).
The notion that a state s (or a path pi) satisfies a formula φ in a IMDP I is denoted
by s |= φ (or pi |= φ), and is defined inductively in Figure 2.
The model checking of IDTMC with respect to the two semantics can give different
results. For example, consider the IDTMC in Figure 1 and the PCTL formula φ. The
UMC semantics of this IDTMC satisfies φ, while the IMDP semantics violates φ.
4 Revisiting DTMC Model-Checking
In this section we outline the basic model checking algorithm for (classical) DTMCs.
The algorithm that we outline here for DTMCs is not the most efficient (like the one
presented in [8]); however the main ideas presented here will form the crux of our model
checking algorithm for UMCs.
The algorithm for model checking DTMCs will reduce the problem to checking the
feasibility of simultaneously satisfying a finite set of polynomial inequalities. This fea-
sibility test can be done by checking if a first-order formula with existential quantifiers
about the real numbers is true. More precisely, we need to check if a formula of the
form ∃x1, . . . , xnP (x1, . . . , xn) is valid over the reals, where P is a boolean function
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of atomic predicates of the form fi(x1, . . . , xn) ./ 0, where fi is a multivariate poly-
nomial and ./∈ {=, 6=,≤,≥, <,>}. It is well-known that this problem can be decided
in PSPACE [20, 6] 2.
The model checking algorithm for DTMC takes a DTMC M = (S, sI ,P, L) and a
PCTL formula φ as input. The output is the set Sat(φ) = {s ∈ S | s |=M φ}, i.e., the
set of all states of the model that satisfy φ. We say M |= φ iff sI ∈ Sat(φ).
The algorithm works by recursively computing the set Sat(φ′) for each sub-formula
φ′ of φ as follows.
Sat(true) = S Sat(a) = {s | a ∈ L(S)}
Sat(¬φ) = S \ Sat(φ) Sat(φ1 ∧ φ2) = Sat(φ1) ∩ Sat(φ2)
Sat(P./p(ψ)) = {s ∈ S | ps(ψ) ./ p}
where ps(ψ) = Prob{pi ∈ Path(s) | pi |=M ψ}. The computation of the set
Sat(P./p(ψ)) requires the computation of ps(ψ) at every state s ∈ S.
If ψ = Xφ, then ps(ψ) =
∑
s′∈Sat(φ) P(s, s
′).
To compute ps(φ1 U φ2), we first split the set of states S into three disjoint subsets,
Sno, Syes, and S? where Sno = Sat(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2), Syes = Sat(φ2), and S? =
S \ (Sno ∪ Syes). Moreover, let S?no be the set {s | ps(φ1 U φ2) = 0} \ Sno and
S>0 be the set {s | ps(φ1 U φ2) > 0}. Note that S = S>0 ∪ S?no ∪ Sno. By [8],
{xs = ps(φ1 U φ2) | s ∈ S} is a solution of the following linear equation system.
xs =
8<
:
0 if s ∈ Sno
1 if s ∈ SyesP
s′∈S P(s, s
′)xs′ if s ∈ S?
(1)
Note that the equation system (1) can have infinite number of solutions. For exam-
ple, consider the formula true U a, where a is an atomic proposition and the DTMC
M = ({s}, s,P, L), where P(s, s) = 1 and L(s) = ∅. Note that s ∈ S?no. The linear
equation system (1) that is instantiated for computing ps(true U a) for M is xs = xs.
The system has infinite number of solutions.
We can ensure that {xs = ps(φ1 U φ2) | s ∈ S} is a unique solution of a system
of equations as follows. Fix a γ such that 0 < γ < 1. Consider the following linear
equation system.
x′s =
8<
:
0 if s ∈ Sno
1 if s ∈ SyesP
s′∈S γP(s, s
′)x′s′ if s ∈ S?
(2)
Lemma 1. x′s > 0 iff s ∈ S>0.
Proof. (Case ⇐) If s ∈ S>0, then ps(φ1 U φ2) > 0. This implies that there is a finite
path from s to a s′ ∈ Syes such that all the states on the path are in S>0 and all the
edges in the path have non-zero probability. Let l(s) be the length of the shortest such
2 If one takes the computational model to be Turing machines, then this result holds when the
coefficients of the polynomials are rationals. One the other hand, if one considers a model of
computation that is appropriate for real number computation, like the one proposed by Blum,
Shub, and Smale [5], then the algorithm can handle even real coefficients.
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path from s. For a state s, if l(s) = 0, then s ∈ Syes and hence x′s = 1. Let us assume
that for any s, such that l(s) = i, x′s > 0. Consider a s, such that l(s) = i + 1.
Then there exists an s′ such that l(s′) = i and P(s, s′) > 0. Therefore, the equation
x′s =
∑
s′∈S γP(s, s
′)x′s′ if s ∈ S? in (2) implies that x′s ≥ γP(s, s′)x′s′ > 0. This is
because x′s′ > 0 by the induction hypothesis. This proves that s ∈ S>0 implies x′s > 0.
(Case ⇒) We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that there is a s such
that x′s > 0 and s 6∈ S>0. Let X be the set {x′s′ | s′ 6∈ S>0 and x′s′ > 0}. Let
s be such that x′s =max(X). If x′s = 1, then s must be in Syes by the system of
linear equations in (2), which is a contradiction. If 1 > x′s > 0, then consider the
equation x′s =
∑
s′∈S γP(s, s
′)x′s′ in (2). Let s′ be such that x′s′ =max{x′s′′ | s′′ ∈
S and P(s, s′′) > 0}. Then x′s ≤ γx′s′
∑
s′′∈S P(s, s
′′) ≤ γx′s′ < x
′
s′ . Because s 6∈
S>0 and P(s, s′) > 0, s′ must not be in S>0. Since x′s′ > x′s and s′ 6∈ S>0, s′ is in X .
Therefore, x′s is not max(X), which is a contradiction. uunionsq.
Lemma 2. The system of linear equations in (2) has a unique solution.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let {x′s = xˆ′s | s ∈ S} and {x′s = x¯′s | s ∈ S}
be two different solutions of the system of linear equations in (2). Let s be such that
xˆ′s 6= x¯
′
s. Then we can find λ0 and λ1 in R such that λ0xˆ′s + (1 − λ0)x¯′s = 0 and
λ1xˆ
′
s + (1 − λ1)x¯
′
s > 0. Note that both {x′s = λ0xˆ′s + (1 − λ0)x¯′s | s ∈ S} and
{x′s = λ1xˆ
′
s + (1− λ1)x¯
′
s | s ∈ S} are also solutions of the system of equations in (2).
The fact that {x′s = λ0xˆ′s+(1−λ0)x¯′s | s ∈ S} is a solution and λ0xˆ′s+(1−λ0)x¯′s = 0
implies that s 6∈ S>0 (by Lemma 1). On the other hand, the fact that {x′s = λ1xˆ′s +
(1− λ1)x¯
′
s | s ∈ S} is solution and λ1xˆ′s + (1− λ1)x¯′s > 0 implies that s ∈ S>0 (by
Lemma 1), which is a contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 3. x′s = 0 iff s ∈ S?no ∪ Sno.
Proof. Consider the subset of equations from (2)
x′s =

0 if s ∈ SnoP
s′∈S γP(s, s
′)x′s′ if s ∈ S?no
(3)
By the definition of S?no, since ps(φ1Uφ2) = 0, any state s′ that is reachable from s by
an edge with non-zero probability is in S?no ∪ Sno. Therefore, the set of equations (3)
only involve variables in {x′s′ | s′ ∈ S?no ∪ Sno}. By Lemma 2, this set of equations
has an unique solution. Note that {x′s = 0 | s ∈ S?no ∪Sno} is a solution to the system
of equations in (3). Hence, the unique solution of the system of equation (2) is such that
x′s = 0 for all s ∈ S?no ∪ Sno. uunionsq
Consider the following system of constraints.
x′s = 0 iff xs = 0 for all s ∈ S (4)
where x′s are variables of (2) and xs are variables of (1).
Lemma 4. The system of linear equations in (1) and (2) has a unique solution given
that the constraints in (4) hold. Moreover, for this unique solution xs = ps(φ1 U φ2),
for all s ∈ S.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let {xs = xˆs | s ∈ S} ∪ {x′s = xˆ′s | s ∈ S} and
{xs = x¯s | s ∈ S} ∪ {x
′
s = x¯
′
s | s ∈ S} be two solutions of (1) and (2) such that (4)
hold. By Lemma 2, for all s ∈ S, xˆ′s = x¯′s. Fix a s such that xˆs 6= x¯s. We can pick a λ
such that λxˆs + (1 − λ)x¯s = 0. Note that {xs = λxˆs + (1 − λ)xˆs | s ∈ S} ∪ {x′s =
λxˆ′s + (1 − λ)xˆ
′
s | s ∈ S} is also a solution to the set of constraints. This implies that
λxˆ′s + (1 − λ)xˆ
′
s = xˆ
′
s = x¯
′
s = 0 by the constraints (4). Again by (4), xˆ′s = x¯′s = 0
implies that xˆs = x¯s = 0, which is a contradiction.
Note that {xs = ps(φ1 U φ2) | s ∈ S} ∪ {x′s = xˆ′s | s ∈ S} is a solution to the
system of linear equations in (1) and (2). Moreover, this solution satisfies the constraints
in (4). Hence, the solution is an unique solution to the system of linear equations in (1)
and (2) such that the constraints in (4) hold. uunionsq
Note that the set of constraints (1), (2), and (4) can be written compactly as follows.
xs =
8<
:
0 if s ∈ Sno
1 if s ∈ SyesP
s′∈S P(s, s
′)xs′ if s ∈ S?
x′s =
8<
:
0 if s ∈ Sno
1 if s ∈ SyesP
s′∈S γP(s, s
′)x′s′ if s ∈ S?
(5)
δs > 0 xs = δsx
′
s
where for each s ∈ S, we introduce the variable δs, such that we can impose the
constraint that xs = 0 iff x′s = 0. The satisfiability of the set of constraints (5) can be
easily reduced to checking if a formula with existential quantifiers belongs to the theory
of reals. The constructed formula is linear in the size of the DTMC.
5 Model Checking UMC
In this section, we reduce the problem of model-checking a UMC to checking the feasi-
bility of a bilinear matrix inequality. (More details about bilinear matrix inequality can
be found in Appendix.) In the non-trivial reduction, we introduce a number of auxiliary
variables to achieve the goal. Note that a simpler PSPACE algorithm, which avoids the
extra auxiliary variables by guessing their values non-deterministically, is possible and
is easy to come up from our reduction. However, we believe that the following reduc-
tion is important from the perspective of implementation in practice using algorithms
to solve bilinear matrix inequalities (BMIs).
Given a UMC I and a PCTL state formula φ, our goal is to check whether I |=
φ. In other words, for every M ∈ [I], M |= φ. Thus, to check whether I |= φ,
we check if there exists some M ∈ [I] such that M |= ¬φ. If such an M does
not exist, we conclude that I |= φ. We will view the problem of discovering whether
a M ∈ [I] satisfies ¬φ as problem of checking the feasibility of a set of bilinear
inequality constraints as follows. Each transition probability of the DTMC M that we
are searching for, will be a variable taking a value within the bounds. We will also have
variables denoting the satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) of each subformula at each state,
and variables denoting the probability of a path subformula being satisfied at each state.
Inequality constraints on these variables will ensure that they all have consistent values.
We now describe this construction formally.
Let us fix an UMC I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L) and a PCTL formula φ. Let M =
(S, sI ,P, L) be an arbitrary Markov chain in [I].
For every pair of states s, s′ ∈ S, let the variable pss′ denote the transition proba-
bility from s to s′ in M, i.e., pss′ denotes P(s, s′). Since M is an arbitrary DTMC in
[I], by the definition of UMC, the following constraints hold: For every state s ∈ S,
∑
s′∈S pss′ = 1 and for every pair of states s, s′ ∈ S, Pˇ(s, s′) ≤ pss′ ≤ Pˆ(s, s′)
Given any PCTL formula φ, let us define the set subfS(φ) (of state sub-formulas)
recursively as follows:
subfS(a) = {a} subfS(¬φ) = {¬φ} ∪ subfS(φ)
subfS(φ1 ∧ φ2) = {φ1 ∧ φ2} ∪ subfS(φ1) ∪ subfS(φ2) subfS(P./p(ψ)) = {P./p(ψ)} ∪ subfS(ψ)
subfS(φ1 U φ2) = subfS(φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) subfS(Xφ) = subfS(φ)
Given a state s ∈ S and any formula φ′ ∈ subfS(φ), either s |=M φ′ or s 6|=M φ′.
For each s ∈ S and each φ′ ∈ subfS(φ), let the variable tφ′s be such that tφ
′
s = 1
iff s |=M φ′; and, tφ
′
s = 0 iff s 6|=M φ′. Following the definition of the various
logical operators in PCTL, we can set up a set of constraints among these variables
such that for any M ∈ [I], the values taken by these variables is consistent with their
intended semantic interpretation. We introduce the following additional variables to
aid in setting up these constraints. For every state s ∈ S and φ′ ∈ subfS(φ), let the
auxiliary variables fφ′s , and uφ
′
s be such that tφ
′
s = 1 ⇐⇒ f
φ′
s = 0 ⇐⇒ u
φ′
s = 1
and tφ′s = 0 ⇐⇒ fφ
′
s = 1 ⇐⇒ u
φ′
s = −1 Clearly, tφ
′
s , f
φ′
s , and uφ
′
s are related by
the following set of constraints:
tφ
′
s f
φ′
s = 0 t
φ′
s + f
φ′
s = 1 2t
φ′
s = u
φ′
s + 1
For every formula φ′ ∈ subfS(φ) of the form P./p(ψ) and for every state s ∈ S, let
pψs be the variable such that pψs denotes Prob{pi ∈ Path(s) | pi |=M ψ} in M.
For each state s ∈ S and for each φ′ ∈ subfS(φ) exactly one of the following
constraints hold depending on the form of φ′:
tφ
′
s = 1 if φ′ = a ∈ L(s) tφ
′
s = 0 if φ′ = a 6∈ L(s)
tφ
′
s = 1− t
φ1
s if φ′ = ¬φ1 tφ1s tφ2s = tφ
′
s if φ′ = φ1 ∧ φ2
uφ
′
s p
ψ
s ≥ u
φ′
s p+ δf
φ′
s if φ′ = P≥p(ψ) uφ
′
s p
ψ
s ≥ u
φ′
s p+ δt
φ′
s if φ′ = P>p(ψ)
uφ
′
s p
ψ
s + δf
φ′
s ≤ u
φ′
s p if φ′ = P≤p(ψ) uφ
′
s p
ψ
s + δt
φ′
s ≤ u
φ′
s p if φ′ = P<p(ψ)
where δ is slack variable that is required to be strictly greater than 0.
Note that the above constraints do not reflect the fact that for each φ′ ∈ subfS(φ)
of the form P./p(ψ), pψs denotes Prob{pi ∈ Path(s) | pi |=M ψ}. To set up such
constraints, we introduce the set subfP(φ) (of path sub-formulas) as follows:
subfP(a) = ∅ subfP(¬φ) = subfP(φ)
subfP(φ1 ∧ φ2) = subfP(φ1) ∪ subfP(φ2) subfP(P./p(ψ)) = {ψ} ∪ subfP(ψ)
subfP(φ1 U φ2) = subfP(φ1) ∪ subfP(φ2) subfP(Xφ) = subfP(φ)
Thus for all sub-formula of φ of the form P./p(ψ), subfP(φ) contains ψ.
For any ψ ∈ subfP(φ) of the form Xφ1 and for each s ∈ S the following constraint
holds:
pψs =
X
s′∈S
pss′ t
φ1
s′
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For each ψ ∈ subfS(φ) of the form φ1 U φ2 and s ∈ S the following constraints
hold.
pψs = t
φ2
s + t
φ1∧¬φ2
s w
ψ
s w
ψ
s =
X
s′∈S
pss′p
ψ
s
As in simple DTMC, if we consider the above constraints only, then we may not have
unique solution for certain pψs . Therefore, we fix a γ such that 0 < γ < 1. Then, as in
simple DTMC model-checking, for each ψ ∈ subfP(φ) of the form φ1 U φ2 and s ∈ S,
we introduce the variables p′ψs and w
′ψ
s , such that the following constraints hold.
p
′ψ
s = t
φ2
s + t
φ1∧¬φ2
s w
′ψ
s w
′ψ
s = γ
X
s′∈S
pss′p
′ψ
s
We want pψs = 0 if p
′ψ
s = 0. To ensure this, for each ψ ∈ subfP(φ) of the form
φ1U φ2 and s ∈ S, we introduce the auxiliary variable δψs and ensure that the following
constraint hold.
δψs > 0 p
ψ
s = δ
ψ
s p
′ψ
s
Let V (I, φ) = {δ} ∪
⋃
s,s′∈S{pss′} ∪
⋃
s∈S,φ′∈subfS(φ){tφ
′
s , f
φ′
s , u
φ′
s } ∪
⋃
s∈S,ψ∈subfP(φ){pψs , wψs , p
′ψ
s , w
′ψ
s , δ
ψ
s } denote the set of variables over which the
above constraints are described and let C(I, φ) denote the above set of constraints.
Lemma 5. For every solution I : V (I, φ)→ R of C(I, φ), there exists a DTMC M =
(S, sI ,P, L) ∈ [I] such that the following holds:
1. I(pss′) = P(s, s′) for any s, s′ ∈ S
2. tφ′s , fφ
′
s ∈ {0, 1} and uφ
′
s ∈ {−1, 1} for any s ∈ S and φ′ ∈ subfS(φ)
3. tφ′s = 1 ∧ fφ
′
s = 0 ∧ u
φ′
s = 1 iff s |=M φ′ for any s ∈ S and φ′ ∈ subfS(φ)
4. tφ′s = 0 ∧ fφ
′
s = 1 ∧ u
φ′
s = −1 iff s |=M φ′ for any s ∈ S and φ′ ∈ subfS(φ)
5. pψs = Prob{pi ∈ Path(s) | pi |=M ψ} for any ψ ∈ subfP(φ)
The proof follows from the observations made while setting up the constraints. An
immediate consequence of the Lemma 5 is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If there exists a solution I of C(I, φ) such that I(tφsI ) = 1, then there
exists an M∈ [I] such that M |= φ.
In order to check if I |= φ, the model checking algorithm sets up the constraints
C(I,¬φ) and checks its feasibility. Clearly, checking the feasibility of C(I,¬φ) is
equivalent to checking if a sentence with existential quantifiers is valid for the reals;
the size of the sentence is polynomial in the size of the UMC. However, the constraints
C(I,¬φ) are bilinear constraints, and we need to satisfy the conjunction of all these
constraints (not an arbitrary boolean function). The feasibility of such constraints can be
more efficiently checked viewing them as bilinear matrix inequalities (BMIs) for which
algorithms [10, 9] and tools [18] have been developed. (More details about bilinear
matrix inequality can be found in Appendix.) We also observe that to prove that the
model checking problem can be solved in PSPACE, we could have constructed a simpler
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set of constraints by first guessing the values of the variables tφ′s , uφ
′
s , and fφ
′
s for the
subformulas φ′, and then solving the constraints resulting from those guesses; since
NPSPACE = PSPACE, we can obtain a deterministic algorithm from this. However, we
believe that in practice solving this single BMI presented here will be more efficient
than solving the exponentially many simpler BMIs that this alternative approach would
yield.
5.1 Complexity of Model-checking UMC
We showed that the model-checking problem for UMC can be reduced to checking the
validity of a formula in the existential theory of the reals. Therefore, the model-checking
problem of UMC is in PSPACE.
We next demonstrate the intractability of the model checking problem for UMC by
reducing the satisfiability and validity of propositional boolean formulas to the model
checking problem. Consider a propositional boolean formula ϕ over the propositions
{p1, . . . , pm}.
We consider the UMC I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L) where
– S = {sI , s1, . . . , sm, s⊥}
– L(sI) = L(s⊥) = {}, L(si) = {pi} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– Pˇ(sI , si) = 0 and Pˆ(sI , si) = 1/m for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– Pˇ(sI , s⊥) = 0 and Pˆ(sI , s⊥) = 1
– Pˇ(si, si) = Pˆ(si, si) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– Pˇ(si, sj) = Pˆ(si, sj) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ m and i 6= j
– Pˇ(s⊥, s⊥) = Pˆ(s⊥, s⊥) = 1
We consider the PCTL formula φ′ obtained from φ by syntactically replacing every
occurrence of pi in φ by P> 1
2m
(Xpi) for 1 < i < m.
Lemma 6. ϕ is satisfiable iff I 6|= ¬φ; ϕ is valid iff I |= φ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is satisfiable and let a be the satisfying assignment. Consider the
DTMC Ma, where P(sI , si) = 12m if a(pi) = false and P(sI , si) =
1
m+1 if a(pi) =
true; P(sI , s⊥) is thus determined by this assignment. It is easy to see that Ma ∈ [I]
and Ma |= φ. Similarly, if M ∈ [I] such that M |= φ, then we can construct a
satisfying assignment for ϕ: a(pi) = false if P(sI , si) ≤ 12m and a(pi) = true if
P(sI , si) >
1
2m . These observations also imply that ϕ is valid iff I |= φ.
Since the satisfiability of general propositional boolean formulas is NP-hard and the
validity of general propositional boolean formulas is co-NP-hard [13], the lower bounds
follow immediately from Lemma 6.
Theorem 2. The model checking problem for UMC with respect to PCTL is NP-hard
and co-NP-hard.
6 Model-checking IMDP
We consider the problem of model checking IMDPs in this section. We will solve the
problem by showing that we can reduce IMDP model checking to model checking
(classical) a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [4, 23]. Before presenting this reduction
we recall some basic properties of the feasible solutions of a linear program and the
definition of an MDP.
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6.1 Linear Programming
Consider an IMDP I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L). For a given s ∈ S, let IE(s) be the following
set of inequalities over the variables {pss′ | s′ ∈ S}:X
s′∈S
pss′ = 1 Pˇ(s, s
′) ≤ pss′ ≤ Pˆ(s, s
′) for all s′ ∈ S
Definition 4. A map θs : S → [0, 1] is called a basic feasible solution (BFS) to the
above set of inequalities IE(s) iff {pss′ = θs(s′) | s′ ∈ S} is a solution of IE(s)
and there exists a set S′ ⊆ S such that |S′| ≥ |S| − 1 and for all s′ ∈ S′ either
θs(s′) = Pˇ(s, s′) or θs(s′) = Pˆ(s, s′).
LetΘs be the set of all BFS of IE(s). The set of BFS of linear program have the spe-
cial property that every other feasible solution can be expressed as a linear combination
of basic feasible solutions. This is the content of the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {pss′ = p¯ss′ | s′ ∈ S} be some solution of IE(s). There there are
0 ≤ αθs ≤ 1 for all θs ∈ Θs, such that
p¯ss′ =
∑
θs∈Θs αθsθ
s(s′) for all s′ ∈ S and ∑s∈S αθs = 1
Lemma 7. The number of basic feasible solutions of IE(s) in the worst case can be
O(|S|2|S|−1).
6.2 Markov Decision Processes (MDP)
A Markov decision process (MDP) is a Markov chain that has non-deterministic tran-
sitions, in addition to the probabilistic ones. In this section we formally introduce this
model along with some well-known observations about them.
Definition 5. If S is the set of states of a system, a next-state probability distribution
is a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that ∑s∈S µ(s) = 1. For s ∈ S, p(s) represents the
probability of making a direct transition to s from the current state.
Definition 6. A Markov decision Process (MDP) is a 4-tuple D = (S, sI , τ, L), where
1. S is a finite set of states,
2. sI ∈ S is the initial state,
3. L : S → 2AP is a labeling function that maps states to sets of atomic propositions
from a set AP,
4. τ is a function which associates to each s ∈ S a finite set τ(s) = {µs1, . . . , µsks} of
next-state probability distributions for transitions from s.
A path pi in an MDP D = (S, sI , τ, L) is a non-empty sequence of the form s0
µ1
→
s1
µ2
→ . . ., where si ∈ S, µi+1 ∈ τ(si), and µi+1(si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. A path can be
either finite or infinite. We use pifin to denote a finite path. Let last(pifin) be the last state
in the finite path pifin. As in DTMC, we denote the ith state in a path pi by pi[i] = si.
We let Path(s) and Pathfin(s) be the set of all infinite and finite paths, respectively,
starting at state s. To associate a probability measure with the paths, we resolve the
non-deterministic choices by a randomized adversary, which is defined as follows:
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Definition 7. A randomized adversary A of an MDP D is a function mapping every
finite path pifin of D and an element of the set τ(last(pifin)) to [0, 1], such that for a
given finite path pifin of D,
∑
µ∈τ(last(pifin))A(pifin, µ) = 1. Let AD denote the set of
all possible randomized adversaries of the MDP D. Let PathA(s) denote the subset of
Path(s) which corresponds to an adversary A.
The behavior of an MDP under a given randomized adversary is purely probabilis-
tic. If an MDP has evolved to the state s after starting from the state sI and following
the finite path pifin, then it chooses the next-state distribution µs ∈ τ(s) with probability
A(pifin, µ
s). Then it chooses the next state s′ with probability µs(s′). Thus the proba-
bility that a direct transition to s′ takes place is
∑
µs∈τ(s)A(pifin, µ
s)µs(s′). Thus as for
IMDPs, one can define DTMC DA that captures the probabilistic behavior of MDP D
under adversary A and also associate a probability measure on execution paths. Given
a MDP D and a PCTL formula ϕ, we can define when D |= ϕ in a way analogous to
the IMDPs (see Figure 2).
6.3 The Reduction
We are now ready to describe the model checking algorithm for IMDPs. Consider an
IMDP I = (S, sI , Pˇ, Pˆ, L). Recall from Section 6.1, we can describe the transition
probability distributions from state s that satisfy the range constraints as the feasible
solutions of the linear program IE(s). Furthermore, we denote by Θs is the set of all
BFS of IE(s). Define the following MDP D = (S′, s′I , τ, L′) where S′ = S, s′I = sI ,
L′ = L, and for all s ∈ S, τ(s) = Θs. Observe thatD is exponentially sized in I, since
τ(s) is exponential (see Lemma 7).
The main observation behind the reduction is that the MDP D “captures” all the
possible behaviors of the IMDP I. This is the formal content of the next proposition.
Proposition 2. For any adversary A for I, we can define a randomized adversary A′
such that ProbI
A
s = Prob
DA
′
s for every s, where ProbX
A
s is measure on paths from s
defined by machine X under A. Similarly for every adversary A for D, we can find an
adversary A′ for I that defines the same probability measure on paths.
Proof. Consider an adversary A for I. For a path pifin let A(pifin) = µ ∈
Steps(last(pifin)). We know from Proposition 1, that there are αθs for θs ∈ Θs such
that
µ(s′) =
∑
θs∈Θs αθsθ
s(s′) for all s′ ∈ S and
∑
s∈S αθs = 1
We now defineA′(pifin, θs) = αθs . It is straightforward to see that ProbI
A
s = Prob
DA
′
s .
The converse direction also can be proved similarly. uunionsq
An important consequence of the above observation is the following main theorem.
Theorem 3. For any PCTL formula ϕ, I |= ϕ iff D |= ϕ.
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Thus, in order to model check IMDP I, we can model check the MDP D for which
algorithms are known [4, 23]. The algorithms for MDP run in time (and space) which is
polynomial in the size of the MDP. Thus, if we directly model check D we get an EXP-
TIME model checking algorithm for I. However, we can improve this to get a PSPACE
algorithm. The reason for this is that it is known that as far as model checking MDPs is
concerned, we can restrict our attention to deterministic, memoryless adversaries, i.e.,
adversaries that always pick the same single non-deterministic choice whenever a state
is visited.
Proposition 3 ([4, 23]). Let Adet be the set of deterministic, memoryless adversaries
for MDP D, i.e., for all A ∈ Adet, A(s, µ) = 1 for exactly one µ ∈ τ(s). Consider a
PCTL formula ϕ = P./p(ψ) such that the truth or falsity of every subformula of ψ in
every state of D is already determined. Then D |= ϕ iff DA |= ϕ for all A ∈ Adet.
For every subformula of the form P./p(ψ), our model checking algorithm, will
model check each of the DTMCs DA, where A is a deterministic, memoryless ad-
versary. This will give us the desired PSPACE algorithm.
Theorem 4. The model-checking algorithm for IMDP is in PSPACE.
Proof. From Lemma 7, we know that the total number of BFSs is O(|S|2|S|−1). Hence
the total number of DTMCs DA for A ∈ Adet is O(|S||S|2|S|
2−|S|). By reusing space
for every subformula P./p(ψ), all of these model checking problems can be solved in
PSPACE. uunionsq
6.4 Iterative Algorithm
The above PSPACE algorithm is computationally expensive for large IMDPs. There-
fore, we propose an alternative iterative algorithm motivated by a similar algorithm
in [2].
The iterative model checking algorithm for PCTL over IMDPs works exactly as
for DTMCs with the exception of handling of P./p(ψ). For these, we need to check if
pAs (ψ) = Prob
A
s ({pi ∈ PathA(s) | pi |= ψ}) satisfies the bound ./ p for all adver-
saries A ∈ AI . Let pmaxs (ψ) and pmins (ψ) be the minimum or maximum probability,
respectively, for all adversaries A ∈ AI , i.e.,
pmaxs (ψ)
def
= supA∈AI [p
A
s (ψ)], p
min
s (ψ)
def
= infA∈AI [p
A
s (ψ)].
Then if ./∈ {<,≤},
Sat(P./p(ψ)) = {s ∈ S | pmaxs (ψ) ./ p}
and if ./∈ {>,≥},
Sat(P./p(ψ)) = {s ∈ S | pmins (ψ) ./ p}
We next describe how to compute the values pmaxs (ψ) and pmins (ψ) for ψ = Xφ and
ψ = φ1U φ2. Recall thatΘs is the set of all BFS of IE(s). It can be shown following [2]
that pmaxs = limn→∞p
max(n)
s where:
pmax(n)s =
8>>><
>>>:
1 if s ∈ Syes
0 if s ∈ Sno
0 if s ∈ S? and n = 0
max{p¯ss′ |s′∈S}∈Θs
nP
s′∈S p¯ss′ .p
max(n−1)
s′
o
if s ∈ S? and n > 0
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and pmins = limn→∞p
min(n)
s where:
pmin(n)s =
8>>><
>>>:
1 if s ∈ Syes
0 if s ∈ Sno
0 if s ∈ S? and n = 0
min{p¯ss′ |s′∈S}∈Θs
nP
s′∈S p¯ss′ .p
min(n−1)
s′
o
if s ∈ S? and n > 0
Note that although the size of Θs can be O(|S|2|S|−1) (by Lemma 7), the compu-
tation of the expressions
max{p¯ss′ |s′∈S}∈Θs
(X
s′∈S
p¯ss′ .p
max(n−1)
s′
)
or min{p¯ss′ |s′∈S}∈Θs
(X
s′∈S
p¯ss′ .p
min(n−1)
s′
)
(6)
can be done in O(|S|) time as follows:
We consider the ordering s1, s2, . . . , s|S| of the states of S such that
p
max(n−1)
s1 , p
max(n−1)
s2 , . . . , p
max(n−1)
s|S| is in descending order. Then the following result
holds.
Lemma 8.
a) There exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ |S| such that {Pˆ(s, s1), . . . , Pˆ(s, si−1), q, Pˇ(s, si+1),
. . . , Pˇ(s, s|S|)} is a BFS of IE(s), where q = 1 −
∑
1≤j≤(i−1) Pˆ(s, sj) −∑
(i+1)≤j≤|S| Pˇ(s, sj).
b) and for that i
max{p¯ss′ |s′∈S}∈Θs
(X
s′∈S
p¯ss′ .p
max(n−1)
s′
)
= pmax(n−1)si .q
+
X
1≤j≤(i−1)
pmax(n−1)sj .Pˆ(s, sj) +
X
(i+1)≤j≤|S|
pmax(n−1)sj .Pˇ(s, sj)
Proof.
a) Let i0 be defined as follows:
i0 = min{i |
iX
j=1
Pˆ(s, sj) +
|S|X
j=i+1
Pˇ(s, sj) ≥ 1}
Observe that such an i0 must exist if the IMDP is well-defined. Consider the
solution {Pˆ(s, s1), . . . , Pˆ(s, si0−1), q, Pˇ(s, si0+1), . . . , Pˇ(s, s|S|)} where q = 1 −∑
1≤j≤(i0−1)
Pˆ(s, sj)−
∑
(i0+1)≤j≤|S|
Pˇ(s, sj). This solution is a BFS of IE(s).
b) Let {p¯ss1 , . . . , p¯ss|S|} be any solution (it may be BFS or not) of IE(s). Then by
simple algebraic simplification it can be shown that
X
1≤j≤(i−1)
pmax(n−1)sj .Pˆ(s, sj)+p
max(n−1)
si
.q+
X
(i+1)≤j≤|S|
pmax(n−1)sj .Pˇ(s, sj) ≥
X
s′∈S
p¯ss′ .p
max(n−1)
s′
given the fact that pmax(n−1)s1 ≥ p
max(n−1)
s2 ≥ . . . ≥ p
max(n−1)
s|S| , and Pˇ(s, s′) ≤ p¯ss′ ≤
Pˆ(s, s′) for all s′ ∈ S. uunionsq
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Similarly, if we consider the ordering s1, s2, . . . , s|S| of the states of S such that
p
min(n−1)
s1 , p
min(n−1)
s2 , . . . , p
min(n−1)
s|S| is in ascending order, then the above Lemma
holds with max replaced by min.
The expressions (6) can be computed in O(|S|) time by finding an i as in Lemma 8.
6.5 Lower Bound for IMDP model-checking
We will show that the model checking problem for DTMCs is P-hard. Since DTMCs
are a special case of IMDPs the P-time lower bound will follows.
To show this we will reduce 3-CNF value, which known to be P-hard [13], to the
problem of model checking DTMCs. Recall that 3-CNF value is the problem where we
are given a 3-CNF formula ϕ and an assignment a to each of the variables, and are
asked whether ϕ evaluates to true or false under the assignment. The reduction is very
similar to the one given Section 5.1.
Consider ϕ =
∧
i∈[1,n](l1i ∨ l2i ∨ l3i) over the propositions {p1, . . . , pm}, where
each ljj ∈ {p1,¬p1, . . . , pm,¬pm} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Construct the
DTMC M = (S, sI ,P, L) where
– S = {sI , s1, . . . , sm, s⊥}
– L(sI) = L(s⊥) = {}, L(si) = {pi} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– P(si, si) = P(s⊥, s⊥) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
– P(sI , si) =
1
2m if a(pi) = false and P(sI , si) =
1
m
if a(pi) = true.
– P(sI , s⊥) = 1−
∑
iP(sI , si)
Let φ =
∧
i∈[1,n](φ1i ∨ φ2i ∨ φ3i), where if lji = pk then φji = P> 1
2m
(Xpk) and
if lji = ¬pk then φji = P≤ 1
2m
(Xpk). Analogous to Lemma 6, one can see that M
satisfies φ if and only ϕ is true under the assignment a. The formal proof is skipped.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated the PCTL model checking problem for two semantic interpreta-
tions of IDTMCs, namely UMC and IMDP. We proved the upper bounds and the lower
bounds on the complexity of the model checking problem for these models. Our bounds
however are not tight. Finding tight lower and upper bounds for these model-checking
problems is an interesting open problem.
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A Motivation
We provide examples to show that UMC and IMDP arise as natural models in many
realistic situations.
UMC in practice. Consider an Internet router having a finite buffer of size b where it
queues up packets received from the Internet. If the buffer is full, the router drops any
received packet. The router processes and transmits packets from the buffer at some
rate which depends on the configuration of the router. Let us assume that the time is
discretized into tiny periods (say 1 µsec). At each time period, with probability p there
is a new arrival. At each time period, with probability q a packet is processed (if there
is one in the buffer) and transmitted by the router. Note that during a time period, we
might have both an arrival and a transmission, or neither.
Given such a router in the Internet, the arrival rate solely depends on the traffic in
the Internet and can be determined exactly under given traffic conditions. However, the
rate (i.e. q) at which the packets leave the router depends on the configuration (e.g.
say security configuration) of the router itself. Suppose, the manufacturer of the router
specifies that q always lie in the range [qmin, qmax], where q is equal to the lower bound
qmin if all the security measures are active, and is equal to the upper bound qmax if none
of the security measures are active. However, the exact value of q when certain number
of security measures are active cannot be determined exactly.
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Fig. 3. Model of Router with Buffer Size 3
Suppose we want to model check a property such as “the probability that the buffer
of a router eventually becomes full is less than 0.01.” For the router in the Internet,
we exactly know the size of the buffer b and the arrival probability p. However, the
departure probability is uncertain and is known to lie in the range [qmin, qmax]. A natural
way to model such a system is using UMCs. A UMC model of the router with buffer
size 3 is given in Figure 3. The arrival probability p is assumed to be known, say 0.5;
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the departure probability q lies in the range [0.5, 0.7] as provided by the manufacturer
of the router. The label on a state gives the number of packets in the buffer of the router.
Yet another situation in which UMC models arise is in “black-box model-
checking” [25]. In black-box model-checking, we assume that the transition probabili-
ties of a DTMC model is not known; rather, we are allowed to estimate the probabilities
using Monte-Carlo simulation. For example, through Monte-Carlo simulation, if we ob-
serve that out of total n transitions from a given state s to any other state there are only
m transitions from s to s′, then we can estimate the transition probability from s to s′ by
m/n. However, this estimation of the transition probability from s to s′ by m/n is not
statistically sound. Instead, we should consider a range of probabilities within which the
actual probability must lie with high probability. Such a range is called a confidence in-
terval [12]. For example, a 99% confidence interval for the transition probability would
be the range [p1, p2], if the probability that our observed transition probability is m/n
given that the actual probability of transition lies in [p1, p2] is 0.99. A confidence inter-
val for a given confidence level and a given observation can be calculated by standard
techniques. Thus for black-box models the estimated values for the various transition
probabilities are better represented as UMCs.
IMDP in practice. There may be situations where the system cannot be modeled as an
UMC. For example, in the router example above, the arrival rate of packets may vary
from time to time depending on the Internet traffic. Therefore, we cannot assume that
p is an exact probability; rather, it lies in a range. At every transition the environment
chooses a p from the range non-deterministically and then decides to send a packet to
the router with the chosen probability p.
Such situations can be naturally modeled as an IMDP, in which every time a
state is visited, a probability distribution respecting certain range constraints is non-
deterministically (possibly even adversarially) chosen, and then a transition is taken
according to the chosen distribution. Thus, in IMDPs the non-deterministic choice is
made over a set of (possibly) uncountably many choices. Note that this is different
from MDPs (Markov Decision Processes) [7, 4] where the number of possible non-
deterministic choices is finite.
For example, Figure 3 gives the IMDP model of a router (with buffer size 3) where,
for simplicity, we assume that the departure probability q is fixed number, say 0.6. The
arrival probability, however, lies in the range [0.3, 0.7] depending on the Internet traffic.
B Bilinear Matrix Inequalities (BMI)
Recall that a k × k matrix A, over the reals, is said to be positive semi-definite if A
is symmetric (i.e., A = AT ) and for every z ∈ Rk, zTAz ≥ 0. We will denote A is
positive semi-definite by A  0.
Optimization programs with bilinear matrix inequalities (BMIs) [22] are of the form
maximize/minimize CTx
subject to
F (x, y) = F0 +
mX
i=0
xiFi +
nX
j=0
yjGj +
mX
i=0
nX
j=0
xiyjHij  0 (7)
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where for every i and j, Fi, Gj and Hij are symmetric matrices of the same dimen-
sion (say k), and C, x ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rn. Thus, the symmetric matrix F (x, y) is an affine
function of the elements of x and y and is required to be positive semidefinite.
Solving such optimization problems is known to be NP-hard [26], but is decidable.
Efficient algorithms [10, 9] and tools [18] have been developed for solving optimization
problems with BMI.
All the optimization problems that are solved during the model checking of UMC
can be written as a single BMI. This follows from some simple observations. Our first
observation says that a set of bilinear matrix inequality constraints can be rewritten as
a single BMI of the form given in Equation (7).
Lemma 9. A set of matrix inequalities
F k0 +
mX
i=0
xiF
k
i +
nX
j=0
yjG
k
j +
mX
i=0
nX
j=0
xiyjH
k
ij  0
for k = 1, . . . ` can be written as a single BMI constraint.
Proof. The single BMI will be of the form
F0 +
mX
i=0
xiFi +
nX
j=0
yjGj +
mX
i=0
nX
j=0
xiyjHij  0
where F0 is a block diagonal matrix with the matrices F k0 along the diagonal; sim-
ilarly Fi, Gj , and Hij be will block diagonal matrices with F ki , Gkj and Hkij along the
diagonal [18]. uunionsq
The model checking problems that we investigate in this paper, will require us to
optimize a simple linear function subject to certain constraints. The constraints that
arise in the context of model checking will be of special forms. The next two lemmas
show that these special constraints can be viewed as BMI constraints.
Lemma 10. For f0, fi, gj , hij ∈ R, the (scalar) inequality
f0 +
mX
i=0
xifi +
nX
j=0
yjgj +
mX
i=0
nX
j=0
xiyjhij ≥ 0 (8)
can be written as a bilinear matrix inequality.
Proof. Let F0, Fi, Gj ,Hij be matrices of dimension 1× 1 whose entries are f0, fi, gj ,
and hij , respectively. Consider
F (x, y) = F0 +
mX
i=0
xiFi +
nX
j=0
yjGj +
mX
i=0
nX
j=0
xiyjHij
It is easy to see that F (x, y) is positive semi-definite if and only if the inequality (8)
holds. uunionsq
Lemma 11. The (strict) inequality δ > 0 can be expressed as a BMI.
Proof. Observe that δ > 0 if and only if xδ ≥ 1, and δ ≥ 0. Thus the observation
follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10. uunionsq
Our last observation is that the BMI requirement that the variables be partitioned
into disjoint sets X and Y , such that the product terms only involve one variable from
X with one from Y can be easily achieved by adding more variables and constraints.
21
Lemma 12. A set of inequalities over the variables V of the form
ak0 +
nX
i=1
aki vi +
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
bkijvivj ≥ 0
for k = 1, . . . ` can written as a BMI.
Proof. For each variable vi ∈ V consider two variables: an “x-copy” vxi and a “y-copy”
vyi . Replace a constraint of the form
ak0 +
nX
i=1
aki vi +
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
bkijvivj ≥ 0 with ak0 +
nX
i=1
aki v
x
i +
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
bkijv
x
i v
y
j ≥ 0
Also, add the constraints vxi = v
y
i for each i. Observe that by Lemma 10, each
constraint can be written as a BMI, where the variables in X are the x-copies of each
variable, and those in Y are the y-copies of each variable. Thus, by Lemma 9, the
resulting set of inequalities can be written as a BMI.
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